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I. INTRODUCTION 
Media reports identified at least 50 of the 130 victims of the 
recent California fires as undocumented immigrants;1 some of 
them suffered severe burns or burned to death.2 Paralleling 
similar language employed by Professor Kevin Johnsons 
characterization of immigrants as the silent victims of the 
deadly [Hurricane Katrina],3 a news report labeled this group 
The Unseen Victims of Californias Wildfires.4 This same 
account criticized the relief efforts in the Southern California 
fires, otherwise praised as effective, as miss[ing] a population 
that has long been in the shadows: undocumented workers living 
along San Diegos hillsides and canyons.5 These essential [farm] 
workers, an estimated 1,600 of them, the sympathetic report 
continued, have slipped through the cracks in the countys relief 
and evacuation effortsso much so that Mexican government 
officials are filling in the gaps.6 Immigrant advocacy groups 
complained that evacuation orders restricted access to the 
migrant workers, impeding their efforts to assist them.7 In 
addition to these imposed physical barriers, workers distrust in 
rescue efforts or fear of being fired meant that many chose to 
stay close to the farms where they worked, without electricity, 
water supply, or sanitation.8 And again, much in the same way as 
described by Johnson about the immigrant hurricane victims,9 
these workers could likely be left out of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA)s relief aid because, without 
papers, they have very limited access to FEMA funds.10 
                                                          
 1. Undocumented Immigrants Victims of California Fires, NEW AMERICA MEDIA, 
Nov. 1, 2007, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id= 
46a62875f444fc2abe4969db0c1f2bdf. 
 2. See Immigrants Faced Climate of Intimidation in California Fires, WORLD 
WAR 4 REPORT, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.ww4report.com/node/4639 (reporting instances 
in which undocumented migrants suffered fatal and nonfatal burn injuries). 
 3. Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons About Immigrants in the Modern 
Administrative State, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 11, 14 (2008). 
 4. Amanda Martinez, The Unseen Victims of Californias Wildfires, NEW AMERICA 
MEDIA, Oct. 26, 2007, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id 
=d70074999a1b81cef632488c949812aa. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. See id. (describing conditions faced by undocumented immigrant workers); see 
also Jim Avila et al., Dangerous Dilemma for Illegal Immigrants, ABC NEWS, Oct. 24, 
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=3769989&page=1 (reporting that despite 
evacuation orders some employers made the agricultural workers stay to save the crops). 
 9. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 53 (chronicling undocumented workers inability 
to gain access to meaningful hurricane relief aid). 
 10. Martinez, supra note 4. 
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Mistreatment of immigrants in these California fires11 was 
unfortunately reminiscent of the Hurricane Katrina story.12 
Despite reports that immigrants caught in the fire were too 
afraid to seek help, the San Diego County Office of Emergency 
Management called upon 300 U.S. Border Patrol agents to help 
with emergency relief.13 For safety control, Border Patrol agents 
were directed to watch for looters and monitor neighborhoods 
affected by the fires.14 Yet, despite assurances from the federal 
government that immigration raids would stop,15 Border Patrol 
continued to enforce immigration laws against immigrants 
during the local relief efforts.16 More than 200 immigrants were 
apprehended during the fires, reportedly while trying to cross 
into the United States.17 The reality is, however, that an 
estimated two million undocumented immigrants live and work 
in the California hills where the fires occurred,18 and it is unclear 
how Border Patrol could (or would) distinguish between old and 
new immigrants. 
Immigration enforcement and racial profiling also occurred 
at Qualcomm Stadium, where volunteers questioned evacuees 
about their immigration status.19 The Los Angeles Times reported 
that U.S. Border Patrol agents arrested six Mexican nationals at 
Qualcomm Stadium for allegedly stealing food and water.20 The 
                                                          
 11. See generally Randal C. Archibold, Residents Flee Wildfires in Southern 
California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2007, at A20 (providing an overview of the California 
wildfires). 
 12. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 54 (documenting the immigration raids that took 
place at Hurricane Katrinas relief centers). 
 13. See Martinez, supra note 4 (reporting on the help of U.S. Border Patrol with 
emergency relief efforts). 
 14. Id.  
 15. See Avila et al., supra note 8 (describing government immigration enforcement 
activities during wildfire relief efforts). 
 16. See Martinez, supra note 4 (recounting the arrest of six undocumented 
immigrants at Qualcomm Stadium, for reportedly stealing from the people in need). 
 17. Id. (describing Border Patrol activities along the U.S.Mexican border during 
the fires). 
 18. Avila et al., supra note 8 (noting estimated population of illegal workers living 
in areas affected by the fires). 
 19. See Immigrants Faced Climate of Intimidation in California Fires, supra note 
2 (relaying ACLU charges that immigrants faced a hostile environment at the stadium). 
 20. Anna Gorman, Six Illegal Immigrants Arrested at Qualcomm, L.A. TIMES: 
BLOGS: BREAKING NEWS, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/breakingnews/2007/10/six-
undocumente.html (Oct. 24, 2007, 02:12 PM) (relating account of immigrants arrest). 
Anti-immigrant bloggers immediately responded to the story to praise the treatment of 
immigrants as outsiders: [T]hese people respect nothing . . . . I have compassion for my 
own and will not sacrifice this great nation for a pathetic unevolved culture that has no 
intention of [assimilating] into this nation. Posting of John MacIntosh to United for a 
Sovereign America (USA), http://immigrationbuzz.com/?p=1335 (Oct. 26, 2007, 7:36 PM). 
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brief story, however, failed to investigate whether any of the 
persons involved in the alleged theft were victims of the fire.21 
Another incident more clearly involved the deportation of fire 
victims. On October 24, San Diego police arrested an evacuated 
Mexican family of sevenfour adults with three children ages 
two, eight, and thirteenas they tried to leave Qualcomm 
Stadium.22 The police turned the family over to Border Patrol 
agents, who deported all of them that evening.23 The family from 
Tijuana reported that a volunteer at Qualcomm Stadium called 
the police, claiming that the family was taking more than their 
share of material aid.24 At least five police officers aggressively 
questioned the family regarding their immigration status and 
called Border Patrol, despite the San Diego Police Departments 
official policy not to collaborate with the immigration agency.25 At 
Qualcomm Stadium, not only was the Border Patrol invited to set 
up an informational tent regarding the fire locations, but San 
Diego city police walked around the stadium, waking up families 
and checking for identification to verify that every person came 
from an evacuated zone.26 The homeless and immigrants without 
identification were particularly affected by these procedures, and 
many were apprehensive of being subject to an immigration 
inspection.27 
These stories of theft are eerily similar to the depictions of 
the mostly black victims of Hurricane Katrina who were 
portrayed as criminals, rather than as victims, for trying to get 
food from abandoned stores in the hurricanes aftermath.28 
Unfortunately, the criminalization of immigrants is all too 
common, even in circumstances that should evoke empathy, not 
disdain. The illegality of immigrants often has justified the 
viewpoints of immigration agencies about who is to blame for 
their victimization. Such agency attitudes are evident in 
                                                          
 21. See Gorman, supra note 20 (excluding any report about whether the alleged 
theft was committed by a victim of the fires). 
 22. Immigrants Faced Climate of Intimidation in California Fires, supra note 2. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The Forgotten Victims of the California Wildfires: Undocumented Migrant Workers 
(Democracy Now! broadcast Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.democracynow.org/ 
2007/10/29/the_forgotten_victims_of_the_california (interviewing Andrea Guerrero, Chair 
of San Diego Immigrant Rights Consortium). 
 27. See id. (explaining reasons for immigrants apprehension in seeking wildfire 
relief). 
 28. See, e.g., Looters Take Advantage of the New Orleans Mess, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 
30, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9131493 (describing various items, including food 
and clothing, taken from stores by Katrina victims). 
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examples that include the Immigration and Customs 
Enforcements views on family separation during raids29 and the 
pattern of victim blaming in human trafficking cases,30 not to 
mention the treatment of immigrants as undeserving victimsor 
even criminalsduring Hurricane Katrina and the California 
fires.31 
Quite appropriately, therefore, Johnson draws broader 
lessons from Hurricane Katrina on the treatment of immigrants 
by the modern administrative state.32 Johnson characterizes 
much of the troubles that plague the immigration bureaucracy as 
symptomatic of a more general failure of American democracy
the lack of political accountability of the immigration 
bureaucracy to the persons most directly affected by its actions.33 
More specifically, he questions the application of the judicial 
deference logic of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.34 to administrative agencies interpretation 
of statutes, particularly as applied to immigration agencies that 
lack political accountability.35 In drawing this conclusion, 
Johnson considers but rejects the possibility that virtual 
representation by other citizen voters and activists could be 
sufficient to protect the rights of immigrants.36 Ultimately, he is 
not arguing to extend immigrants the right to vote, although his 
position appears to rest on legal and pragmatic impediments 
rather than normative judgments.37 Thus, when more directly 
addressing how we can make agencies more accountable to the 
                                                          
 29. See Oskar Garcia, Study: Raids Risk Kids Mental Health, ABC NEWS, Oct. 31, 
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=3802560 (cataloguing negative effects on 
children caused by the arrest of immigrant parents). 
 30. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Modern-Day Slavery and Cultural Bias: 
Proposals for Reforming the U.S. Visa System for Victims of International Human 
Trafficking, 7 NEV. L.J. 826, 83233 (2007) (suggesting that current immigration 
enforcement policies may encourage bias against human trafficking victims). 
 31. See supra notes 1928 and accompanying text (discussing racial profiling by 
authorities). 
 32. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 19 (arguing that the governments treatment of 
immigrants during Hurricane Katrina exemplifies the governments system-wide poor 
treatment of immigrants). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84245 
(1984) (setting forth explicitly what has now been termed Chevron deference). 
 35. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 20 (positing that Chevron deference logic is 
inappropriately applied to immigration agency decisions). 
 36. Id. at 40 (stating that virtual representation cannot equate to direct 
representation). 
 37. Id. at 42 (arguing that while the vote need not be extended to immigrants, the 
faulty rationale for application of Chevron deference to immigration decisions demands 
stricter judicial review). 
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needs of noncitizens,38 Johnson concludes that [a]t a minimum, 
careful judicial review of agency decisions pertaining to 
immigrants is necessary to ensure some modicum of a check of 
bureaucratic error and abuse in our system of checks and 
balances.39 
Johnson is not looking to the courts as the sole solution to 
the plight of immigrants at the hands of the administrative state, 
but he is making the strong moral claim that courts must step up 
to protect them: One could forcefully argue that careful judicial 
review is most necessary when the agencys competence, 
independence, and impartiality have been seriously questioned. 
Especially in instances involving critically important decisions 
affecting a discrete and insular (and disenfranchised) minority, 
basic due process concerns militate in favor of meaningful 
judicial review.40 An underlying basis for Johnsons position 
appears to be a strong disillusionment with a political climate 
that is increasingly hostile to immigrants. The articles 
description of the legal landscape plaguing immigrants includes 
Congresss passage of laws that treat immigrants in draconian 
fashion.41 Additionally, Congress recently failed to pass 
legislation remedying the extreme vulnerability and uncertainty 
of approximately twelve million undocumented immigrants who 
live in the United States.42 In June 2007, the comprehensive 
immigration reform bill that would have offered undocumented 
persons a path to legalization43 failed to get the sixty votes 
needed to end the debate in the Senate and have it pass for a 
vote.44 Then, in October 2007, came the more surprising defeat of 
the DREAM Act of 2007,45 which similarly fell short of receiving 
the votes needed. The DREAM Act would have provided a path to 
legalization for undocumented youth brought as children to the 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 57.  
 39. Id. at 71. 
 40. Id. at 31. 
 41. Id. at 22. 
 42. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 
2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY i (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/ 
reports/61.pdf (estimating current U.S. population of unauthorized immigrants). 
 43. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 44. Klaus Marre, 4653, Immigration Bill Goes Down in Defeat, THE HILL, June 28, 
2007, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/immigration-bill-goes-down-in-defeat-2007-06-
28.html. 
 45. Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, S. 2205, 
110th Cong. (2007).  
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United States who pursued an education or joined the military in 
the United States.46 
Professor Johnsons moral call upon the courts to protect 
immigrant rights seems obviously urgent in this climate of anti-
immigrant political hostility. Yet, in this very same political 
climate, the judiciary is unlikely to respond to the plight of 
immigrants in the absence of substantial political backing of a 
pro-immigrant civil rights movement. Political scientists have 
time and again deemed courts as part of the national political 
coalition.47 Indeed, courts decisionmaking is strongly influenced 
by national political majorities and national public opinion . . . .48 
This point has not escaped consideration by Johnson when 
writing about the struggle for Latino civil rights.49 Specifically on 
the role of courts in immigration, he has expressed reserved 
enthusiasm that judicial review can truly advance immigrant 
rights.50 While citing studies finding that judicial review of 
executive implementation of immigration laws in the 1980s 
overturned a significant number of cases in favor of immigrants, 
courts largely left intact the deep structural flaws in the 
immigration bureaucracy.51 Professor Johnson recently made this 
point more emphatically when he and Professor Bill Ong Hing 
reflected on the Immigration Rights Marches of 2006. They 
wrote: 
Although the courts at times have facilitated social change, 
todays courts are not especially prone to do so. . . . Leading 
                                                          
 46. Id. (providing a path to potential legal permanent residence for anyone who, 
among other requirements, came to the United States prior to his or her sixteenth 
birthday and has either attained a high school diploma or its equivalent, or been admitted 
to an institution of higher learning). 
 47. Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1537, 1538 (2004) (citing Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 279 (1957)); see also Gregory 
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of 
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 138788 (1998) (concluding that party 
affiliation is a more salient factor in judicial decisionmaking than gender or race). 
 48. Balkin, supra note 47, at 1538. 
 49. In 1995, for example, Dean Johnson contrasted Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), which mandated the desegregation of public schools, with Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982), which granted undocumented students the right to K12 
public education, [to demonstrate] the need for political action to accompany a litigation 
strategy in order to successfully bring about social change. Kevin R. Johnson, Civil 
Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First 
Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 44 (1995). He noted then that [w]hile Brown was a part of a 
much larger social movement, Plyler was not. Id. As a result, the aftermath of Plyler 
faced a great deal of post anti-immigrant organizing to try to overturn its ruling in the 
absence of a concerted strong political base to counter those efforts. Id. at 48. 
 50. Johnson, supra note 49, at 4647. 
 51. Id. at 47. 
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Democrats and civil rights advocates have expressed 
distress and pessimism about the future of a conservative 
judiciary. . . . Such a judiciary will make legal change more 
difficult but may simultaneously open the door to a broad-
based political coalition of progressive forces.52 
In a post-9/11 world, Professor Johnson is correct about the 
limited role courts are willing to take on behalf of immigrants. 
Prior to September 11, immigration scholars were predicting the 
demise of the plenary power doctrine, which grants Congress 
discretion to regulate immigration in the absence of meaningful 
constitutional scrutiny.53 This position changed radically after 
September 11, and that political tide remains. For example, the 
conflation of national security and immigration54 led the U.S. 
Supreme Court to issue rulings shortly after 9/11 that reaffirmed 
the strength of Congresss plenary power to control 
immigration.55 At the same time, political actors in the federal 
and local governments moved to solidify their unfettered power 
over immigrants. Congress legislated not only to further restrict 
judicial review over its immigration powers56 but also to expand 
these powers beyond the border into the regulation of the lives of 
ordinary citizens within the border.57 Additionally, the executive 
                                                          
 52. Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and 
the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 130 (2007). 
 53. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative 
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration 
Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 285 (2000) (describing factual circumstances that lead to 
cases that undermine the plenary power doctrine); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of 
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002) (naming Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 
(2001), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), as two Supreme Court decisions that 
pointed toward an end of the plenary power doctrine). 
 54. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime 
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 183031 (2007) (discussing the 
national security rhetoric used in calls for immigration reform). 
 55. See Jennifer Korte Doucleff, Demore v. Kim: Upholding the Unnecessary 
Detainment of Legal Permanent Residents, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 625 (2004) 
(contrasting the Courts denial of the indefinite detention of aliens three months prior to 
9/11 in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), with Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), 
in which the Court upheld Congresss power to impose mandatory detention post-
removal); Kevin R. Johnson, Latinas/os and the Political Process: The Need for Critical 
Inquiry, 81 OR. L. REV. 917, 919 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court decision in 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), to deny back pay 
remedies to an undocumented worker for NLRB violations). 
 56. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, 
and the Rule of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 161, 16366 (200607) 
(discussing the judicial stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act). 
 57. See Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Aliens in Our Midst Post-9/11: 
Legislating Outsiderness within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 1711 (2005) 
(Our key concern . . . is that when the Real ID Acts drivers license provisions are 
implemented in May 2008, they will become the vehicle for legislating the outsiderness of 
noncitizens within our borders.). 
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branch seized the opportunity to employ and expand its 
immigration powers to conduct law enforcement,58 while local 
police became immigration law enforcers.59 Finally, local 
governments passed hundreds of anti-immigrant measures 
restricting immigrants access to basic necessities such as 
housing and drivers licenses.60 
In short, immigrants live in a hostile climate. Certainly, 
judicial intervention is still desirable and does make a difference 
in some areas. For example, the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
reviewed many immigration decisions after the Board of 
Immigration Appeals streamlining reforms introduced deep 
flaws in the administrative process.61 But immigrants need much 
more to reverse the tide. A strong civil rights movement 
including both electoral and nonelectoral engagement is 
essentialwhether changes come from the political process at 
the local or federal level, or from the courts. 
In this brief response, I explore the potentials and limits of this 
civil rights struggle on behalf of immigrants in this current climate. 
More specifically, I focus on two areas: (1) the role of electoral 
politics and Latina/o voters and (2) the role of nonelectoral civil 
engagement by Latinos, including noncitizen immigrants. These are 
not the only political avenues for mass mobilization on behalf of 
immigrants, nor are these alone sufficient to improve the plight of 
noncitizens. Johnson and Hing are correct about the need to 
broaden the agenda and increase participation beyond immigration 
and immigrants respectively to improve the moral legitimacy and 
effectiveness of any new civil rights movement.62 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
 58. See Raquel Aldana, The September 11 Immigration Detentions and 
Unconstitutional Executive Legislation, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 5, 611 (2004) (tracking the 
Attorney Generals increase in immigration enforcement and promulgation of 
immigration regulations); Raquel Aldana, Of Katz and Aliens: Privacy Expectations and 
the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=993969) (stating that the 
lack of congressional action has left the executive branch to intensify immigration raids). 
 59. See Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of 
Federal Immigration Law, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 83, 85 (2004) (describing local 
enforcement of federal immigration law as encouraged by the federal government). 
 60. Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the Alien, 46 WASHBURN 
L.J. 263, 28385 (2007); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Drivers Licenses and Undocumented 
Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 21617 (2004) (arguing 
that the limitation of access to drivers licenses is a civil rights issue). 
 61. See John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of 
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent 
Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 7780 (2005) (tracking the reversal 
rates of the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
 62. Johnson & Hing, supra note 52, at 101; see also Richard Delgado, Locating 
Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neoliberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 489, 516 (2004) (reviewing GEORGE YANCEY, WHO IS WHITE?: LATINOS, 
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Latinos are crucial to this struggle, and the potential for their 
mobilization deserves scrutiny. To do this, I have consulted 
Professor Johnsons insightful and prolific assessment of the issue of 
a civil rights movement and immigration,63 as well as the writings of 
other scholars.64 I focus specifically on whether more recent changes 
in the demographics and attitudes among Latinos living in the 
United States could improve the cautious outlook toward immigrant 
rights that has accompanied much of the literature on Latinos and 
political change. For example, is there hope for increased electoral 
participation by Latinos? With the recent anti-immigrant climate, 
are Latinos more likely to align in greater numbers behind the 
plight of immigrants, at least in their demands for greater civil 
rights protections? What lessons can be drawn from the potential 
for sustained nonelectoral civic engagement among Latinos beyond 
the 2006 immigration marches? 
                                                          
ASIANS, AND THE NEW BLACK/NONBLACK DIVIDE (2003)) (critiquing the blackwhite 
paradigm for locating Latinos in the civil rights struggle and arguing for expansion of the 
civil rights discourse to improve coalitions among minority groups that move us beyond 
the race-based equal protection paradigm); Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil 
Rights: The Need for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within 
Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759, 766 (2003) (recognizing the inherent barriers to the 
formation of such coalitions). 
 63. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, The Continuing Latino Quest for Full 
Membership and Equal Citizenship: Legal Progress, Social Setbacks, and Political 
Promise, in THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1960, at 
391 (David D. Gutiérrez ed., 2004); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, 
Popular Democracy, and Californias Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal 
Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629 (1995); Johnson, supra note 49; Kevin R. 
Johnson, Immigration, Civil Rights, and Coalitions for Social Justice, 1 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 181 (2003); Johnson, supra note 55; Kevin R. Johnson, Law and Politics in 
Post-Modern California: Coalition or Conflict Between African Americans, Asian 
Americans, and Latina/os?, 4 ETHNICITIES 381 (2004); Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: 
Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and 
Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139 (1993); Johnson & Hing, supra note 52; Johnson, 
supra note 62. 
 64. See generally Alianza Conference: Toward a National Latino Agenda, 6 HARV. 
LATINO L. REV. 91 (2003); John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New 
Demography in a Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253 (2001); Kathay Feng et al., 
Voting Matters: APIAs, Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV. 
849 (2002); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, The Latina/o and APIA Vote Post-2000: What Does It 
Mean to Move Beyond Black and White Politics?, 81 OR. L. REV. 783 (2002); Gerald P. 
López, Learning About Latinos, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 363 (1998); M. V. Hood III et. 
al., ¡Quedate o Vente!: Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion Toward 
Immigration, 50 POL. RES. Q. 627 (1997); The Sixth Annual Harvard Latino Law and Policy 
Conference: Latino Leadership and Collective Power, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 75 (2004); 
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II. ELECTORAL POLITICS AND LATINA/O VOTERS 
On September 15, 2007, the Wall Street Journal, in an 
article titled Hispanic Voters Flex Political Muscle, observed that 
the first Spanish-language debate among Democratic 
presidential candidates that aired the prior weekend on 
Univision, a Spanish-language television network in the United 
States, underscored the growing political clout of Hispanics.65 
The article also noted that all Republican candidates except 
Senator John McCain refused to attend a similar forum, which 
had to be cancelled, and that such nonparticipation threatens to 
unravel the gains made by President Bush, who has aggressively 
courted Hispanic votes.66 The Journal also cautioned that 
Republican opposition to immigration reform could further 
mobilize Hispanic voters in favor of Democrats, particularly 
given the growing number of Hispanics in swing states, such as 
Florida, Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.67 
On November 28, 2007, the New York Times followed with 
an article titled Walking a Tightrope on Immigration.68 The 
article focused on the Republican and Democratic candidates 
positions on illegal immigration, which the author suggested 
was a politically divisive topic.69 More interestingly, the article 
placed great emphasis on the importance of candidates courtship 
of the Latino vote in their positions on immigration: Pollsters on 
both sides agree there is widespread anxiety, even anger, about 
the impact of illegal immigration. But an increasingly influential 
Hispanic electorate could be turned off by a hard line from the 
party they turned to in increasing numbers in the last two 
presidential elections.70 
For the past decade, the growing Latino population in the 
United States was perceived as a tremendous source of untapped 
potential political power.71 Unlike recent reports in major 
national newspapers, however, the assessment of whether Latino 
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electoral participation could adequately safeguard the rights of 
immigrants has been more skeptical. Sources of skepticism have 
been at least two-fold.72 First, there are very real impediments to 
Latino electoral participation, including large pockets of voter 
disenfranchisement due to lack of citizenship status, combined 
with lower overall voter turnout among Latinos.73 Second, 
Latinos, like other racial minority groups, have opinions that 
span the political spectrum. [T]he great heterogeneity of the 
Latino community, Johnson wrote in 1995 on this precise issue, 
makes internal agenda-setting a difficult endeavor.74 
The assessment appeared a bit more hopeful after the 2002 
midterm elections. Analysts of Latino political participation and 
outcomes in the elections observed positive trends, evidenced by 
improved participatory numbers overall and Latinos increased 
visibility between the parties and among the candidates.75 Still, 
many lamented that actual voter participation, as compared to 
increased voter eligibility based on demographic changes and 
increased (but insufficient) naturalization rates,76 still lagged 
quite behind.77 Moreover, on the immigration issue, the jury was 
still out for Latino voters. Some of these same analysts pointed to 
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evidence that deep political cleavages continued to divide the 
interests of Latino citizens from those of immigrants and 
questioned whether the former could offset the rising trend in 
noncitizen discrimination.78 
But, are the New York Times and Wall Street Journal correct 
in 2007 to predict that Latinos will impact immigration policy? 
New studies provide a source of some hope based on actual voting 
trends between 2002 and 2006, as well as on projections for 
future elections. These studies suggest a trend toward greater 
cohesion among Latino voters on issues of immigration. These 
indicators alone are unlikely to be sufficient to change the tide 
toward more favorable immigration policies, but they cannot be 
dismissed entirely. 
A. The Numbers: 2006 Elections and Predictions for 2008 
According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 5.6 million Latinos 
voted in the 2006 midterm elections.79 This number accounted for 
5.8% of all votes cast in the election, which is an increase from 
5.3% in 2002.80 This increase is largely a function of simple 
demographic growth among Latinos.81 Latinos represented nearly 
half the total population growth in the past four years with an 
increase in population of 5.7 million.82 
Despite this burst in population growth, Latinos continue to 
lag behind whites and blacks in voter registration and actual 
voting patterns. In fact, demographic factors and participation 
rates for 2006 reveal that 13% of the Latino population voted, as 
compared to 39% of whites and 27% of blacks.83 
Part of the explanation for lower numbers among Latinos 
resides in the high number of ineligible voters. Despite an 
increase in naturalization rates over the last four years,84 among 
the new population growth, less than one-third (30%) were new 
eligible voters (more than one-third were too young and another 
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one-third were noncitizen adults).85 As such, Latinos portion in 
comparison with all new eligible voters was merely 20%.86 By 
comparison, whites comprised 24% of the population growth, but 
46% of all new eligible voters.87 Thus, for the November 2006 
elections, only 39% of all Latinos residing in the United States 
were eligible to vote, as compared to 76% of whites and 65% of 
blacks.88 
However, voter ineligibility is not the entire explanation for 
low Latino electoral participation. In 2006, Latinos were still 
registering to vote at lower rates than other groups.89 In addition, 
Latino registered voters also voted in fewer percentages than 
other groups,90 although foreign-born Latinos voted in higher 
proportions.91 
One pressing question is whether more Latinos will 
participate in the 2008 election. There is some reason to hope, as 
evidenced by voter attitudes and well-organized voting 
campaigns by several key players, including unions, grassroots 
organizations, and the Latino media. The estimate is that 
between ten to twelve million Latinos will be registered to vote 
by the 2008 presidential election.92 
For example, in 2007 the Ya es Hora, Ve y VotaIts Time, Go 
Vote! campaign, a coalition of Latino advocacy and media 
organizations, began an attempt to naturalize one million legal 
permanent residents.93 This effort represents the first time the 
Latino media has come together in an integrated manner with 
community organizations, unions, and churchesa fact that 
participants believe will make a significant difference in Latino 
voter participation in the next election.94 According to campaign 
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organizers, [b]etween January and September [2007], more than 
940,000 green-card holders applied for U.S. citizenship.95 Moreover, 
these new voters are in states that could be new battlegrounds in 
2008, such as Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Colorado.96 In 
November 2007, the Ya es Hora, Ve y Vota campaign unveiled 
new phases of their campaign that will include public service 
announcements in Latino television, print ads in newspapers, and a 
dedicated voter registration website.97 Similarly, Telemundo, a 
Spanish language television network, and mun2, the first national 
cable network offering bilingual programming for young U.S. 
Latinos, launched the Vota Por Tu FuturoVote 4 UR Future 
campaign in October 2007, which focuses on registering Latino 
youths.98 Surveys of Latinos indicate that Spanish-language media 
and nonpartisan voter mobilization efforts are playing a crucial role 
mobilizing the Latino vote.99 A notable impediment to this effort, 
however, is the backlog created by the increase in naturalization 
applications at USCIS, resulting in delays that will deny the 
opportunity to vote to hundreds of thousands.100 
In addition, in October 2007, more than 1500 people gathered 
in downtown Los Angeles for the Second Annual National Latino 
Congreso, a national gathering of Latino leaders in the United 
States, to develop a united agenda on mobilizing Latino voting for 
the 2008 election and efforts to defeat anti-immigrant efforts 
nationwide.101 At the gathering, participants shared their ideas on 
community-based Latino mobilization efforts and addressed the 
inherent challenges involved in mobilizing a culturally and 
politically diverse electorate.102 The groups goal was to have ten 
million voters participate in the 2008 election.103 
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Furthermore, a November 2006 survey conducted by the 
National Council of La Raza (NCLR) and the National 
Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) 
found that half of all Latino voters surveyed (1,050) reported 
being more enthusiastic about voting than in the past.104 In the 
November 2006 survey, 75% of voters rated their interest in the 
election somewhere between eight and ten, an increase from the 
56% who rated their interest at those levels in September 2006.105 
Similarly, a 2006 Pew Hispanic Center survey found that three-
quarters of Latino respondents believe that the immigration 
debate will drive more Latinos to vote in the Presidential 
election.106 
B. Latino Voters on Immigration 
The next question is whether Latino voters still lack a 
discernible cohesion as voters on immigration issues, particularly 
on such matters as comprehensive immigration reform and anti-
immigrant measures. Here, some data suggests that greater 
cohesion may be forming among Latinos in support of pro-
immigration policies, in great part due to the recent fierce 
immigration debate and the increasingly visible mistreatment of 
immigrants. 
Based on a 2006 national survey of 2000 Latino adults on 
the immigration debate,107 the Pew Hispanic Center concluded 
that Latinos are feeling more discriminated against, politically 
energized and unified following the immigration policy debate 
and the pro-immigration marches this spring.108 In this survey, 
approximately 14% of Latinos refer to immigration as the most 
important problem facing the country today, second only to the 
war in Iraq (22%).109 Similarly, the November 2006 
NCLR/NALEO survey also found that, while only 9% of 
respondents reported immigration as their primary concern, a 
majority of Latinos (51%), including half of young voters, 
reported that immigration was the most important or one of the 
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most important issues in deciding their vote.110 The 2006 Pew 
Hispanic Latino Survey on Immigration also revealed a 
somewhat greater sense of solidarity among Latinos of different 
nationalities. Now, 58% of Latinos see fellow Hispanics from 
different countries working together to achieve common political 
goals, versus 34% who say they are not working together.111 
But what do these numbers mean in terms of specific issues 
affecting immigrants? The 2006 Pew Hispanic Latino Survey on 
Immigration revealed that Latinos, who now as a group feel more 
discriminated against as a result of the immigration debate, also 
express somewhat more favorable views towards immigrants on 
two issues.112 First, [a] greater share of native-born Latinos 
(45%) now favors increasing the number of legal immigrants 
from Latin America, although that number is higher among the 
foreign born, with nearly half (48%) in favor.113 Among all Latinos 
surveyed, the majority (72%) believes undocumented immigrants 
help the economy.114 These trends are higher than they were in 
2002.115 
In addition, 41% of Latinos opine that those who have been 
in the country for at least five years should be permitted to 
stay.116 In contrast to the general public, moreover, only 5% of 
Latinos believe that no undocumented immigrants should be 
allowed to remain and become citizens.117 On these issues, 
however, there are divisions between the foreign-born and 
native-born Latinos, with 61% of all foreign born saying that all 
undocumented should be able to stay as compared to only 51% of 
native born.118 Here, the strongest indicators of opinions and 
positions regarding these issues are family ties and direct 
experiences concerning immigration.119 
Between 55% and 70% of surveyed Latinos favor temporary 
workers, while a large minority (between 30% and 40%) oppose 
them.120 The opposition encompasses views that range from those 
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who do not want any form of legalization to those who view such 
programs as impractical or insufficiently generous to 
immigrants.121 
On enforcement issues, [m]ost Latinos (66%) oppose 
building fences between the U.S.Mexico border, and even more 
(70%) are against sending the National Guard.122 A slight 
majority (51%) opposes increasing the number of border patrol 
agents.123 Here too, however, there are greater differences 
between the native-born and foreign-born Latinos, with a slight 
majority of native born (53%) favoring additional border patrol 
agents, while a majority (59%) of foreign born opposes that 
increase.124 Differences also arose on employer immigration 
verification databases, with about 42% of foreign-born Latinos 
and 70% of native-born Latinos supporting the database.125 
Unfortunately, the 2006 Pew Hispanic Latino Survey on 
Immigration did not ask specific questions on other key questions 
affecting Latinos today, particularly in regard to the hundreds of 
anti-immigrant measures that were adopted following 9/11. 
These include restrictions on undocumented immigrants access 
to drivers licenses, public benefits, and higher education, as well 
as sanctions for employers or landlords who employ or lease to 
the undocumented, respectively.126 Results from local anti-
immigrant measures provide some evidence that the Latino 
electorate overwhelmingly opposes these restrictive 
regulations,127 but greater research is needed. 
In general, within electoral politics, Latino demographic 
trends are increasing the influence of the Latino electorate, while 
the current immigration debate appears to be motivating greater 
Latino political participation. These are important trends that 
elected representatives and candidates cannotand should not
ignore. Nevertheless, these trends alone cannot sufficiently turn 
the tide against the nations fierce anti-immigrant climate. 
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Consider, for example, that to date, despite these trends, 
neither major national party, Democrat or Republican, has made a 
firm commitment to tackle anti-immigrant policies.128 Their failure 
to do so may partly explain why Latinos are also not firmly 
committing to either party, despite their greater alliance around 
immigration issues. Analysts of the Latino electorate reveal that 
Latino voters are to some extent holding the Republican Party 
responsible for what they perceive to be the negative consequences 
of the immigration debate,129 but they disagree more on the actual 
political impact of that assessment. Some see at least short-term 
Latino partisanship moving strongly toward the Democrats as a 
direct response to some Republicans strong opposition to 
comprehensive immigration reform and the perceived mean-
spiritedness of the debate in the Republican-controlled House.130 
Others, however, observe that the Democratic Party has not made 
significant gains among Latinos and, by some measure, may have 
lost support.131 The 2006 Pew Hispanic Latino Survey on 
Immigration, moreover, reported that one out of every four Latinos 
believe that neither political party offers the best option on 
immigration issues, more than three times those who felt this way 
two years ago.132 Similarly, 37% of Latinos favor Democrats, while 
the same percentage sees no difference between the parties; this 
number, however, shifts significantly in favor of Democrats among 
registered Latino voters (46%) versus the 9% favoring Republicans 
when asked which party has more concern for Latinos.133 
One significant task, therefore, is to assess why political 
parties are not being sufficiently pro-immigrant. One explanation 
may reside still in the low numbers of the Latino electorate, 
which is estimated now to be around 9%.134 Another explanation 
may be that despite greater pro-immigrant stances among 
Latinos in recent times, these issues still divide Latinos.135 
Nevertheless, this picture is only part of the story. The attitudes 
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and activism of other voters with regard to immigration also 
affect the debate. For example, while small in numbers, radical 
anti-immigrant groups are very effective at mobilizing against 
pro-immigrant proposals.136 Perhaps more importantly, the 
ambivalence among Latino voters on some issues, such as 
increased immigration or legalization proposals, is at times 
shared in greater numbers among groups who might otherwise 
be allies in the civil rights struggle.137 While a full analysis of this 
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, any civil rights struggle 
on behalf of immigrants must address the issue of integrating 
into the movement other progressive voices. 
III. THE PROMISE OF NONELECTORATE LATINO CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT: THE 2006 IMMIGRATION MARCHES AND BEYOND 
 Any analysis of nonelectorate Latino civic engagement must 
consider the notable 2006 pro-immigration marches. For three 
months between March 10 and May 1, 2006, these marches 
attracted about five million Latino immigrants and their 
supporters to demand legalization for immigrants and to oppose 
the Sensebrenner bill,138 which would have criminalized 
undocumented immigrants and those organizations that provided 
assistance to them.139 In some cities, these were the largest 
demonstrations in their history, and nationwide, these marches 
constituted the largest mobilization of immigrants in U.S. 
history.140 
 Professor Johnson, along with Professor Bill Ong Hing, was 
among the first legal scholars to analyze the prospects for a new 
civil rights movement based on the 2006 immigration rights 
marches.141 Their assessment, however, was tamed enthusiasm at 
best, and even doubtful, at least for its future prospects. Johnson 
and Hing acknowledged, for instance, that at the outset, the 
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marches seemed to stall the Sensenbrenner bill.142 Ultimately, 
however, they conceded that not only did comprehensive 
immigration reform fail to pass, but Congress voted to expand 
the U.S.Mexican fence.143 In addition, Johnson and Hing 
highlight various shortcomings in the movement, including its 
narrow reactionary focus on anti-immigrant legislation,144 its 
failure to attract a broader coalition of supporters, especially 
among African Americans,145 and even reservations as to its 
sustainability.146 All of these observations are fair criticisms of the 
March 2006 marches. However, they also overlook a host of 
highly significant lessons to be drawn from them and the 
potential contributions these could make going forward.  
 The sustainability of any immigrant civil rights movement 
should not depend alone on the continued visibility of mass 
mobilizations of immigrants, as it is often the efforts behind the 
scenes, away from the spotlight, that matter the most. These 
marches cannot be viewed in isolation as separate from decades-
long grassroots immigrant rights movement or as sporadic 
reactionary mobilizations. Part of the explanation for the 
unprecedented and surprisingly large numbers of protesters 
certainly resides in spontaneous and organic mobilization from 
various groups, including young high school and elementary 
school students;147 but, the marches had their roots in the work of 
local advocates of immigration reform, labor unions, churches, 
and others in the Latino community.148 Not long before, in 2003, 
nearly 1000 immigrants and allies rode to Washington, D.C. 
demanding basic rights and civil liberties for immigrant 
workers.149 This movement, inspired by the Freedom Rides of the 
Civil Rights Movement, also had roots in a coalition of unions, 
immigrant rights groups, community organizations, and lawyer 
activists,150 and sought to make visible on the national stage the 
less noticed everyday work of immigrant rights organizers locally 
in the workplace, schools, courts, and administrative agencies. 
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PRAC. 65, 65 (2006).  
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Thus, while the high visibility of marches or freedom rides 
matters, more significant are the numerous grassroots 
organizations promoting and creating civic engagement among 
Latinos living in the United States.  
 Across the United States, numerous churches, labor unions, 
and immigrant rights groups are organizing Latinos, recently 
arrived or not, to participate more actively in promoting change 
in the schools their children attend, in local elections against 
anti-immigrant measures, or in lobbying their local 
representatives in the adoption of pro-immigrant policies, and 
even in improving the lot of their families back home by pushing 
for reforms in their home countries.151 Studies assessing the effect 
of Latino participation in community-based efforts reveal that 
such activities spark broader civic engagement, including among 
the poor, and vest Latinos with resources necessary to take on 
individualistic forms of politics.152 Immigrants need institutional 
guidance to integrate into U.S. society, and of course, to 
encourage political participation.153 This is particularly true in 
immigrant populations for whom electoral participation is not an 
option. A more balanced approach toward civil integration of 
immigrants in the United States, therefore, must move beyond 
simple naturalization drives. Furthermore, greater civic 
integration is necessary to address the challenges posed by 
nonparticipation of second and third generation immigrants who 
are eligible voters but disengaged from politics. 154 Nonelectoral 
participation, for example, has the potential to raise Latino group 
consciousness, which increases how much Latinos engage in 
political participation.155  
                                                          
 151. See, e.g., Ruth Milkman, Introduction to ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE 
CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CALIFORNIA 224 (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000) 
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POLY 47, 4752 (2003) (chronicling the efforts and lessons learned through organizing 
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became a turning point, inspiring and empowering people).  
 153. Skerry, supra note 64, at 28. 
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 155. See Atiya Kai Stokes, Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation, 
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 Aside from promoting a culture of political participation, civic 
engagement by immigrants has other important benefits for 
political participation among already eligible voters. Studies 
reveal, for example, that due to education and socio-economic 
levels, Latino voters generally possess a disturbingly low 
knowledge about political issues when they vote. 156 Studies also 
reveal that voters with low levels of information, such as Latinos, 
rely more heavily on candidate likeability, rather than a firm 
knowledge of issues, sometimes to the detriment of their own 
interests.157 Greater civic engagement, however, increases 
political information capital, which allows voters to make 
informed decisions about voting as opposed to voting for 
candidates on the basis of popularity.158 This is particularly 
important when considering immigration policy and particular 
issues, such as guest worker programs. While guest worker 
programs on their face seem pro-immigrant, division exists 
among immigrant advocates about whether they help or hurt 
immigrant workers.159  
The 2006 marches themselves, in fact, promoted a culture of 
greater political participation, increased group consciousness, 
and increased political information capital; all of which could 
translate to more positive outcomes in the local and national 
political landscape for immigrants. This is a benefit of the 2006 
marches that Johnson and Hing acknowledge in their assessment 
when noting that political culture involves more than voting and 
registration rates, especially for noncitizen immigrants ineligible 
to vote.160 The evidence, however, suggests that even among 
eligible voters, the marches could still make a difference at the 
urns. NALEOs 2006 survey, for example, revealed a strong 
linkage between likely voters and those who participated in the 
marches and rallies. Nearly one-third of voters said they or 
someone close to them participated in the marches.161 
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Latino Electorate, 59 POL. RES. Q. 259, 260 (2006). 
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The evidence also suggested greater Latino group 
consciousness as a result of the marches. A study conducted by 
the Pew Hispanic Center, for example, revealed that almost two-
thirds of Latinos think the pro-immigrant marches signal the 
beginning of a new and lasting social movement.162 A majority of 
respondents also believe that Latinos are working together 
toward common goals.163 Indeed, Latino mobilization against anti-
immigrant measures, rather than revealing a weakness, helped 
to solidify greater Latino group cohesiveness on a broader 
antidiscrimination agenda, regardless of immigration status.164 
Another potential benefit of the marches was the involvement of 
youth, which will hopefully translate to their greater electoral 
participation in the future. 
 Thus, even if marches of the same scale do not resurface, or 
even if they do not actually alter immigration policy right away, 
this should not be the sole measurement of their success. Rather, 
their real legacy will be in promoting greater grassroots 
involvement among Latinos when they return to their 
communities, or a greater interest in and more informed political 
participation. At a minimum, the immigrant marches re-
energized the immigrant rights movement.165 Today, various 
coalitions are advancing a plan of action that focuses on voter 
registration, citizenship drives, community forums, and other 
mobilizations and rallies.166 The marches allowed key groups in 
this movement to air out and begin to address their differences, 
as was the case between unions and immigrant rights advocates 
who parted ways on philosophical differences over certain 
policies and tactics.167 Hopefully, this airing of conflict, which is a 
necessary part of any sustainable movement, will facilitate 
coalition building and enable the aim to be broader in the future 
by including, for example, the voices of African Americans. 
Johnson, Hing, and others see potential on the issue of workers 
rights as a unifying theme of this broader coalition.168  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The anti-immigrant climate is currently strong at the local 
and national levels. Turning the political tide to favor 
immigrants will require an equally strong political response from 
pro-immigrant allies. The growing numbers of Latinos in the 
United States, many of whom are immigrants169 and, among 
them, many of whom are undocumented,170 makes them potential 
allies in the struggle of immigrants for greater rights in this 
country. There are some positive signs in this regard. In the 
electoral process, Latinos appear more prepared now than before 
to vote, and motivated to do so in great part by a desire to 
counter anti-immigrant policies, which they perceive as also 
discriminating against Latinos. There is also a trend for greater 
civic engagement by Latinos particularly at the local level, even 
among those ineligible to vote. This trend is especially important 
as the federal government devolves in this area, while states 
seize greater immigration powers. Latinos alone will not 
determine U.S. immigration policy, but all of these trends reveal 
that they are becoming an important voice in a much needed civil 
rights movement on behalf of immigrants in this country. 
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